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Abstract—Non-malleable code is a relaxed version of error-
correction codes and the decoding of modified codewords results
in the original message or a completely unrelated value. Thus,
if an adversary corrupts a codeword then he cannot get any
information from the codeword. This means that non-malleable
codes are useful to provide a security guarantee in such situations
that the adversary can overwrite the encoded message. In 2010,
Dziembowski et al. showed a construction for non-malleable
codes against the adversary who can falsify codewords bitwise
independently. In this paper, we consider an extended adversarial
model (affine error model) where the adversary can falsify
codewords bitwise independently or replace some bit with the
value obtained by applying an affine map over a limited number
of bits. We prove that the non-malleable codes (for the bitwise
error model) provided by Dziembowski et al. are still non-
malleable against the adversary in the affine error model.
I. INTRODUCTION
As we know, error-correction codes can recover the orig-
inal message from a corrupted codeword (within admissible
errors) and error-detection codes can detect if the codeword
is corrupted while the error correction may not be possible.
The notion of non-malleable codes, invented by Dziembowski,
Pietrzak, and Wichs [11], is a relaxed notion of error de-
tection codes or error correction codes. (The term “non-
malleability” comes from non-malleable cryptography [9]. For
non-malleable codes, we suppose that errors would be caused
by some adversary’s malicious behaviors. If the adversary tam-
pers a codeword of a non-malleable code, its decoding results
in either the original message or an independent message of
the original one. Thus, non-malleable codes are applicable
to situations where error-detection and error-correction are
impossible. For example, they provides a security guarantee
against adversaries who can overwrite encoded messages.
We suppose that the adversary tampers a codeword C
by applying a function f to C. We consider the situation
where a message s ∈ {0, 1}k is randomly encoded and the
encoded message is tampered by f . We denote the resulting
corrupted codeword by a random variable Tamper fs . For the
non-malleability, it is desirable that, for any s, s′ ∈ {0, 1}k, the
random variables Tamper fs and Tamper
f
s′ are almost identical
to each other. But, it may happen that the decoding result s˜
for a tampered codeword coincides with the original message
s. In this case, it is clear that Tamper fs is dependent on s.
Thus, we consider a probability distribution Df whose support
includes s˜ and a special symbol same∗. By using the above
probability distribution, the notion of non-malleability codes
can be defined. A code is non-malleable if there exists a
probability distribution Df such that, for any s ∈ {0, 1}k,
the following two probability distributions are statistically
indistinguishable: (1) the induced probability distribution from
Tamperfs and (2) the probability distribution which is the
identical to Df but if same∗ appears then we replace it with
s.
In general, there is no non-malleablde code for any tam-
pering functions. In [11], Dziembowski et al. consider a
class of bitwise independent tampering functions and give
a construction of non-malleable codes with respect to the
class of bitwise independent tampering functions. Faust et
al. [12] provide efficient non-malleable codes with respect
to tampering functions which can be computed by poly-size
circuits. Chandran et al. [3] consider block-wise tampering and
show the impossibility of non-malleable codes with respect
to block-wise tampering in the information theoretic setting.
They also give a construction of non-malleable codes with
respect to block-wise tampering from the viewpoint of the
computational complexity theory. Aggarwal et al. [1] consider
more possibility of computational non-malleable codes. In the
literature (e.g., [7], [5], [10], [4]), several tampering models
are proposed and connections to other research areas such
as randomness extractors and locally decodable codes are
discussed.
In this paper, we extend bitwise independent tampering to
“affine” tampering, where the adversary can falsify codewords
bitwise independently or replace some bit with the value
obtained by applying an affine map over a limited number
of bits. We prove that the non-malleable codes with respect
to bitwise independent tampering, provided by Dziembowski
et al. [11], are still non-malleable with respect to the affine
tampering in the information theoretic setting.
II. NOTATIONS
Let g be a randomized function and g(x; r) be the functional
value on input x which can be computed with supplimentary
randomness r. If we do not have to specify the randomness
r, we denote it by g(x). If D is a probability distribution,
d ← D means that a value d is chosen according to the
probability distribution D. For a finite set B, |B| denote the
number of elements in B. For an n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n,
wH(x) denotes the Hamming weight of x. For two strings
x and x′ of equal length, dH(x, x′)
def
= wH(x, x
′) denotes
the Hamming distance between x and x′. SD(X0, X1)
def
=
1
2
∑
x∈X |PX0(x) − PX1(x)| denotes the statistical distance
between two probability distributions X0 and X1 of the
same support. If SD(X0, X1) is negligibly small for two
probability distributions X0 and X1, we say that X0 and
X1 are statistically indistinguishable and write X0 ≈ X1. If
SD(X0, X1) = 0, we write X0 = X1.
III. PREVIOUS RESULTS
In this section, we review the previous results by Dziem-
bowski et al. in [11].
Definition 1: (Coding Scheme) A coding scheme is a pair
of two functions (Enc,Dec), where Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n
is a (randomized) encoding function and Dec : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} is a deterministic decoding function satisfying
that Pr[Dec(Enc(s)) = s] = 1 for every s ∈ {0, 1}k.
The desired property for non-malleable codes is discussed
in Section I. We give a formal definition of non-malleable
codes below.
Definition 2: (Non-malleability) Let F be a class of tamper-
ing functions and (Enc,Dec) be a coding scheme. For each
f ∈ F and s ∈ {0, 1}k, define a random variable as follows:
Tamper fs
def
=


c← Enc(s);
c˜← f(c);
s˜← Dec(c˜);
Output s˜.

 .
The randomness of Tamperfs comes from the randomness to
compute the encoding function Enc. If, for each f ∈ F and
for each s, there exists a universal probability distribution Df
over {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥, same∗} such that
Tamper fs ≈


s˜← Df ;
If s˜ = same∗ then output s;
Otherwise, output s˜.


then we say that (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to
F . If the statistical distance in the above is bounded by ε, we
say the non-malleable code (Enc,Dec) is ε-secure.
Dziembowski et al. [11] showed a non-malleable code
against the adversary who can tamper codewords bitwise
independently. Their construction is just a combination of
algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes by Cramer et
al. [8] and a linear error-correction secret sharing scheme [11].
Definition 3: (AMD codes [8]) Let (A, V ) be a coding
scheme, where A : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n is an encoding
function and V is a decoding function. If, for some ρ, for
every s ∈ {0, 1}k and for every ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n \ {0n},
Pr[V (A(m) + ∆) 6= ⊥] ≤ ρ, then we say that (A, V ) is
an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) coding scheme of
ρ-security.
Definition 4: (LECSS scheme [11]) Let (E,D) be a coding
scheme. Suppose that (E,D) satisfies the following three
properties:
Linearity:
For every c ∈ {0, 1}n such that D(c) 6= ⊥ and for
every ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have the following:
D(c+∆) =
{
⊥ if D(∆) = ⊥,
D(c) +D(∆) otherwise.
Distance d:
For every c˜ ∈ {0, 1}n\{0n} whose Hamming weight
is less than d, we have D(c˜) = ⊥.
Secrecy t:
For any s, let C = (C1, . . . , Cn) = Enc(s) be a
random variable, where Ci is the i-th bit of C. Then
{Ci}1≤i≤n are t-wise independent. Each (marginal)
Ci is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
Then we say that (E,D) is a (t, d)-linear error-correction
secret-sharing (LECSS) scheme.
Bitwise independent tampering can be described as
f(c1, . . . , cn) = (f1(c1), . . . , fn(cn)),
where each fi is
• the bit-flipping function (i.e., fi(b) = 1⊕ b),
• the identity function (i.e., fi(b) = b),
• the 0-constant function (i.e., fi(b) = 0), or
• the 1-constant function (i.e., fb(1) = 1).
We denote the class of bitwise independent tampering func-
tions by FBIT . That is,
FBIT =
{
f = (f1, . . . , fn) : fi ∈
{
bit-flipping, identity,
0-constant, 1-constant
}}
.
Theorem 5: ([11]) Suppose that (E,D) is a (d, t)-LECSS
scheme where d > n/4 and (A, V ) is a ρ-secure AMD coding
scheme. By using these schemes, we define a coding scheme
(End,Dec) as follows:
Enc(s) = E(A(s));
Dec(c) =
{
⊥ if D(c) = ⊥,
V (D(c)) otherwise.
Then, (Enc,Dec) is ε-secure non-malleable with respect to
FBIT , where ε ≤ max(ρ, 2−Ω(t)).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this paper, we show that Dziembowski’s non-malleable
code with respect to FBIT is also non-malleable with re-
spect to a class of affine tampering functions, which is a
generalization of FBIT . Informally speaking, the class of
affine tampering functions includes all the bitwise independent
tampering functions and also includes functions f such that
c˜2 = f(c1, c2) = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ 1, where bits at some positions
are altered into a sum of several bits and some constant.
Here, we define a new function: fi is said to be ℓ-affine if
fi(b1, . . . , bn) =
(⊕
j∈B bj
)
⊕ b for some bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
some set B ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |B| ≤ ℓ. We define a class
of affine tampering functions as follows:
Fℓ-AFFINE
=
{
f = (f1, . . . , fn) : fi ∈


bit-flipping, identity,
0-constant, 1-constant,
ℓ-affine


∧ all ℓ-affine functions are ℓ-wise independent
}
,
where functions g1, . . . , gk are said to be ℓ-wise independent
if their functional values on the uniform random inputs are
ℓ-wise independent.
Remark: For each ℓ-affine function fi(b1, . . . , bn) =(⊕
j∈B bj
)
⊕ b, there is the correponding vector βi =
(a1, . . . , an), where aj = 1 if j ∈ B and aj = 0
otherwise. Note that wH(βi) ≤ ℓ. To choose ℓ-wise inde-
pendent functions, we first choose vectors β1, . . . , βk such
that rank[β1 β2 · · · βk] ≥ min{k, ℓ}. From such vectors
β1, . . . , βk, we can construct k ℓ-affine functions which are
ℓ-wise independent.
Theorem 6: Suppose that (E,D) is a (d, t)-LECSS scheme
where d > 3n/8 and (A, V ) is a ρ-secure AMD coding
scheme and define a coding scheme (Enc,Dec) as follows:
Enc(s) = E(A(s));
Dec(c) =
{
⊥ if D(c) = ⊥,
V (D(c)) otherwise.
}
Then (Enc,Dec) is ε-secure non-malleable with respect to
Ft-AFFINE , where ε ≤ max(ρ, 2−Ω(t)).
In the proof in [11] that (Enc,Dec) stated in Theorem 5 is
non-malleable with respect to FBIT , {1, . . . , n} is partitioned
into two subsets B1 and B2, where B1 = {i : fi is either 0-
constant or 1-constant} and B2 = {i : fi is either bit-flipping
or identity}. They considered several cases with respect to
|B1| and |B2| and analyzed the security for each case. We
partition {1, . . . , n} into three subsets (say, B1, B2 and B3)
and consider several cases with respect to |B1|, |B2| and |B3|.
Proof: We show that (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with
respect to Ft-AFFINE and its security ε satisfies
ε ≤ max
(
ρ,
1
2t
+
(
t
n(d/n− 3/8)
)t/2)
for any even t > 6. We let f = (f1, . . . , fn) be a tampering
function in Ft-AFFINE and define a universal distribution Df
for showing that (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to
Ft-AFFINE .
For any message s ∈ {0, 1}k, we consider several prob-
ability distributions and use the following notations Cs :=
Enc(s), C˜s := f(Cs), ∆s := C˜s − Cs, S˜s := Dec(C˜s).
Csi , C˜
s
i and ∆si for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} denote the i-th bit
of Cs, C˜s and ∆s, respectively. We partition i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
into three subsets B1, B2 and B3 as follows: B1 = {i : fi
is 0-constant or 1-constant}, B2 = {i : fi is bit-flipping or
identity} and B3 = {i : fi is t-affine}. We let p = |B1|,
q = |B2| and r = |B3|, which satisfy p+q+r = n. We define a
probability distribution Patch(Df , s) as follows: First, sample
s˜ as s˜← Df . If s˜ = same∗ then output s instead of same∗.
Otherwise, output s˜ as it is. We will construct Df such that,
for any s, SD(S˜s,Patch(Df , s)) ≤ ε. Before discussing each
case, we need some useful property:
Fact: If i ∈ B3 then C˜si is the uniform distribution
over {0, 1} and the joint distribution {C˜si }i∈B3 is t-wise
independent because of t-secrecy of the LECSS scheme and
t-wise independence of affine functions in Ft-AFFINE for any
s. So is {∆si = C˜si − Csi }i∈B3 .
Case 1: p ≤ t− r
We show that ∆s for each s is identical to ∆s′ for any other
s′.
• If fi is the identity function, then we have ∆si = 0. If fi
is bit-flipping, then we have ∆si = 1.
• If i ∈ B1 ∪B3 then ∆si is the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}, since |B1 ∪ B3| = |B1| + |B3| = p + r ≤ t
imply that {Csi }i∈B1∪B3 is t-wise independent. Thus, we
have {∆si = C˜si −Csi }i∈B1∪B3 is the uniform distribution
regardless of s.
Therefore, there exists a universal probability distribution ∆
such that ∆ = ∆s for any s and we have
S˜s = Dec(C˜s)
= V (D(Cs +∆s))
= V (D(Cs) +D(∆s)) (1)
= V (A(s) +D(∆s))
= V (A(s) +D(∆)),
where (1) is by the linearity of the LECSS scheme.
1) If D(∆) 6= 0 then the security of AMD codes imply
that Pr[S˜s = ⊥] ≥ 1− ρ.
2) If D(∆) = 0 then we have Pr[S˜s = s] = 1.
From 1) and 2), we define Df as follows: First, sample δ as
δ ← ∆. If D(δ) = 0 then output same∗. Otherwise, output
⊥. Then, we have SD(S˜s,Patch(Df , s)) ≤ ρ for any s. This
completes the proof in Case 1.
Case 2: p ≥ n− t
In this case, we show that C˜s for each s is identical to C˜s′
for any other s′.
• If fi is 0-constant, then C˜si = 0. If fi is 1-constant, then
C˜si = 1.
• For any i ∈ B2 ∪B3, C˜si is the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}, since p ≥ n− t implies that |B2 ∪B3| = |B2|+
|B3| = q+ r ≤ t. Thus, we can say that {Csi }i∈B2∪B3 is
the uniform distribution and {C˜si = f(Csi )}i∈B2∪B3 are
independent uniform distributions for any s.
Furthermore, there exists a universal distribution C˜ such that
C˜ = C˜s for any s and we have S˜s = Dec(C˜s) = Dec(C˜). We
define the distribution Df which samples C˜ as above and com-
putes Dec(C˜). This implies that SD(S˜s,Patch(Df , s)) =
SD(S˜s, Df ) = 0 for any s. This completes the proof in Case
2.
Case 3: t− r < p ≤ (n− r)/2
In this case, we show that a probability distribution that always
outputs ⊥ is a universal distribution Df . Since, for any s,
Pr[S˜s 6= ⊥] = Pr[Dec(C˜s) 6= ⊥]
= Pr[D(∆s) 6= ⊥],
it suffices to show that Pr[D(∆s) 6= ⊥] is small. {∆si}i∈B2 is
fixed to a constant by f (if fi is the identity function then ∆si
is fixed to 0 and if fi is bit-flipping then ∆si is fixed to 1) Let
δ∗ ∈ {0, 1}n be any value which is consistent with the fixed
bits of ∆ so that {∆si = δsi }i∈B2 and for which D(δ∗) 6= ⊥.
If no such value exists then we are done since D(∆s) = ⊥
with probability 1. So let us assume that some such value
exists. Since t < p + r ≤ (n + r)/2, {∆si}i∈B1∪B3 are t-
wise independent uniform distributions and we have Pr[∆s =
δ∗] ≤ 1/2t. On the other hand, we show that dH(∆s, δ∗) is
not so large. The expected value of the Hamming distance
between ∆s and δ∗ satisfies the following.
E[dH(∆
s, δ∗)] = E[
n∑
i=1
dH(∆
s
i , δ
∗
i )]
= E[
∑
i∈B1∪B3
dH(∆
s
i , δ
∗
i )] (2)
=
∑
i∈B1∪B3
E[dH(∆
s
i , δ
∗
i )] (3)
=
p+ r
2
. (4)
In the above, (2) holds since ∆s = δ∗ for i ∈ B2
and thus {dH(∆si , δ∗i )}i∈B2 = 0. (3) is by the linear-
ity of the expectation. For (4), since ∆si are indepen-
dent for i ∈ B1 ∪ B3, we consider the probability that
dH(∆
s, δ∗) =
∑
i∈B1∪B3
dH(∆
s
i , δ
∗
i ) is larger than d. Since
{dH(∆
s
i , δ
∗
i )}i∈B1∪B3 are t-wise independent, we can apply a
Chernoff-Hoeffding tail bound as in [2], [13]. Thus, we have
Pr[dH(∆
s, δ∗) ≥ d]
≤ Pr
[∣∣∣∣dH(∆si , δ∗i )− p+ r2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ d− p+ r2
]
≤
(
nt
(d− p+r2 )
2
)t/2
(5)
≤
(
nt
(d− n+r4 )
2
)t/2
≤
(
t
n( dn −
3
8 )
2
)t/2
. (6)
In the above, (5) follows from Lemma 2.2 in [2] by Bellare
and Rompel. For (6), we use r < n/2 since r ≤ t. Hence, we
have
Pr[D(∆s) 6= ⊥]
≤ Pr[∆s = δ∗ ∨ dH(∆
s, δ∗) ≥ d]
≤
1
2t
+
(
t
n( dn −
3
8 )
2
)t/2
and this completes the proof in Case 3.
Case 4: (n− r)/2 < p ≤ n− t
In this case, we show that a probability distribution that always
outputs ⊥ suffices for a universal distribution Df . To this end,
we show that the probability that Pr[S˜s 6= ⊥] = Pr[D(C˜s) 6=
⊥] is small for any s. Since (n − r)/2 < p ≤ n − t, we
t < q+ r < (n+ r)/2 and thus {C˜si }i∈B1 are fixed by f . Let
c˜∗ ∈ {0, 1}n be any value which is consistent with the fixed
portion of C˜s so that {C˜si = c˜si}i∈B1 . If no such value exist
then we are done. Otherwise, we can use the similar discussion
as in Case 3 and we have
Pr[dH(C˜
s, c˜∗) ≥ d]
≤ Pr[C˜s = c˜∗ ∨ dH(C˜
s, c˜∗) ≥ d]
≤
1
2t
+
(
t
n( dn −
3
8 )
2
)t/2
.
This complete the proof in Case 4.
For any cases of p, q, r, we have completed the proof. Thus,
we can say that Theorem 6 holds.
Remark: In Theorem 6, we use a (d, t)-LECSS code where
d > 3n/8. This requires that an LECSS code for non-
malleability with respect to Ft-AFFINE must be better than
ones with respect to FBIT . Chen et al. [6] have shown the
existence such LECSS codes.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have extended the bitwise independent tampering to
the affine tampering and shown that the non-malleable codes
in [11] with respect to the bitwise independent tampering is
also non-malleable with respect to the affine tampering. Our
tampering model for the affine tampering may be a bit artificial
because of some technical reason. As mentioned, the property
of being “affine” is useful to construct ℓ-wise independent
functions. But, this does not rule out the possibility to con-
struct ℓ-wise independent functions from non-affine tampering
functions. Thus, in future, we may find a wider class of
tampering functions for which there exists a non-malleablde
coding scheme.
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